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ELIMINATION OF ARBITRARY AUTOMOBILE
STOPS: THEORY AND PRACTICE
I. Introduction
The authority of the police to enforce the statutory restrictions
governing vehicle and traffic laws has often been considered to be
concomitant with a right to stop motorists arbitrarily to determine
their compliance.' Recently, some courts have eroded this power,'
to protect the constitutional rights guaranteed to individuals under
the fourth amendment.'
In their consideration of these arbitrary automobile stops, the
courts have utilized a balancing process. They consider the state
interest in promoting public safety on the highways through the
guaranteed enforcement of the relevant laws, as well as the duty of
the police to detect and control crime. Additionally, there is the
interest of the individual in unrestricted travel, and his penumbral
right of privacy under the United States Constitution.4
1. See, e.g., United States v. Marlow, 423 F.2d 1064 (5th Cir. 1970); D'Argento v. United
States, 353 F.2d 327 (9th Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 384 U.S. 963 (1966); Garsed v. State, 51
Ala. App. 622, 288 So. 2d 161 (Crim. App. 1973); State ex rel. Berger v. Cantor, 13 Ariz. App.
555, 479 P.2d 432 (Div. 1, 1970); Palmore v. United States, 290 A.2d 573 (D.C. Ct. App. 1972),
aff'd on other grounds, 411 U.S. 389 (1973); State v. White, 18 N.C. App. 31, 195 S.E.2d 576
(Ct. App.), cert. denied and appeal dismissed, 283 N.C. 587, 196 S.E.2d 811 (1973); State v.
Garcia, 16 N.C. App. 344, 192 S.E.2d 2 (Ct. App. 1972); State v. Maloney, 109 R.I. 166, 283
A.2d 34 (1971); Murphy v. State, 194 Tenn. 698, 254 S.W.2d 979 (1953); Black v. State, 491
S.W.2d 428 (Tex. Crim. App. 1973); Oliver v. State, 455 S.W.2d 291 (Tex. Crim. App. 1970).
2. See, e.g., United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. 873 (1975); Almeida-Sanchez v.
United States, 413 U.S. 266 (1973); United States v. Mallides, 473 F.2d 859 (9th Cir. 1973);
United States v. Nicholas, 448 F.2d 622 (8th Cir. 1971); People v. Ingle, 36 N.Y.2d 413, 330
N.E.2d 39, 369 N.Y.S.2d 67 (1975); Commonwealth v. Swanger, 300 A.2d 66 (Pa.), aff'd on
rehearing, 453 Pa. 107, 307 A.2d 875 (1973).
3. U.S. CONST. amend. IV provides:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects,
against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants
shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particu-
larly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.
4. See, e.g., United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. 873 (1975); Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S.
1 (1968); Myricks v. United States, 370 F.2d 901 (5th Cir.), petition for cert. dismissed, 386
U.S. 1015 (1967); Patenotte v. United States, 266 F.2d 647 (5th Cir. 1959); State ex rel. Berger
v. Cantor, 13 Ariz. App. 555, 479 P.2d 432 (Div. 1, 1970); Mincy v. District of Columbia, 218
A.2d 507 (D.C. Ct. App. f966); State v.,Fish, 280 Minn. 163, 159 N.W.2d 786 (1968); State
v. Kabayama, 98 N.J. Super. 85, 236 A.2d 164 (App. Div. 1967), aff'd, 52 N.J. 507, 246 A.2d
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The elements considered by the courts in the balancing process
have not changed; rather, it is the weight attached to each which is
outcome determinative. The courts initially permitted such stops in
all instances.5 Later, this was restricted to some degree. Now, how-
ever, some courts have held the individual's rights to be para-
mount
This Comment will survey the judicial tests that have been devel-
oped to eliminate arbitrary stops, and examine their effectiveness
in protecting the rights of motorists.'
II. Constitutional Considerations
In order to challenge these statutory provisions as unconstitu-
714 (1968); People v. Kuhn, 33 N.Y.2d 203, 306 N.E.2d 777, 351 N.Y.S.2d 649 (1973); People
v. Dozier, 52 Misc. 2d 631, 276 N.Y.S.2d 145 (Oneida County Ct. 1967); State v. Maloney,
109 R.I. 166, 283 A.2d 34 (1971); Leonard v. State, 496 S.W.2d 576 (Tex. Crim. App. 1973);
cf United States v. Turner, 442 F.2d 1146 (8th Cir. 1971); United States v. Riggs, 347 F.
Supp. 1098 (E.D.N.Y. 1972), aff'd,- 474 F.2d 699 (2d Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 820
(1973); People v. Rosenheimer, 209 N.Y. 115, 102 N.E. 530 (1913).
5. See cases cited in note 1, supra.
6. This generally has been accomplished by specifying that the stop may not be used as
a subterfuge for an otherwise illegal seizure. See, e.g., Wilson v. Porter, 361 F.2d 412 (9th Cir.
1966); United States v. Bonanno, 180 F. Supp. 71 (S.D.N.Y. 1960); State v. Smolen, 4 Conn.
Cir. 385, 232 A.2d 339 (App. Div.), appeal denied, 155 Conn. 720, 231 A.2d 283 (1967), cert.
denied, 389 U.S. 1044 (1968); Mincy v. District of Columbia, 218 A.2d 507 (D.C. Ct. App.
1966); Byrd v. State, 80 So. 2d 694 (Sup. Ct. Fla. 1955); People v. Harr, 93 Ill. App. 2d 146,
235 N.E.2d 1 (2d Dist. 1968); Commonwealth v. Hagan, 464 S.W.2d 261 (Ky. App. 1971);
Commonwealth v. Mitchell, 355 S.W.2d 686 (Ky. App. 1962); State v. Fish, 280 Minn. 163,
159 N.W.2d 786 (1968); Coston v. State, 252 Miss. 257, 172 So. 2d 764 (1965); Morgan v. Town
of Heidelberg, 246 Miss. 481, 150 So. 2d 512 (1963); State v. Severance, 108 N.H. 404, 237
A.2d 683 (1968); State v. Williams, 237 S.C. 252, 116 S.E.2d 858 (1960); Murphy v. State,
194 Tenn. 698, 254 S.W.2d 979 (1953); State v. Baker, 78 Wash. 2d 327, 474 P.2d 254 (1970);
cf. United States v. Leal, 460 F.2d 385 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 889 (1972); People v.
Francis, 4 111. App. 3d 65, 280 N.E.2d 49 (2d Dist. 1972); People v. Carey, 11 Mich. App. 213,
160 N.W.2d 799 (Div. 2, 1968), rev'd on other grounds, 382 Mich. 285, 170 N.W.2d 145 (1969);
People v. Loveland, 71 Misc. 2d 935, 338 N.Y.S.2d 548 (Seneca County Ct. 1972). But see
Kraft v. State, 18 Md. App. 169, 305 A.2d 489 (1973); People v. Regan, 30 App. Div. 2d 983,
294 N.Y.S.2d 154 (3d Dep't 1968); People v. Isaac, 38 Misc. 2d 1018, 239 N.Y.S.2d 624 (Sup.
Ct. 1963).
7. See cases cited in note 2 supra.
8. Even in those decisions concerned with the legality of the search and/or arrest following
the initial stop, the courts first had to rule on the validity of the stop itself, in order to reach
these later issues. See, e.g., United States v. Nicholas, 448 F.2d 622 (8th Cir. 1971); State ex
rel. Berger v. Cantor, 13 Ariz. App. 555, 479 P.2d 432 (Div. 1, 1970); Palmore v. United
States, 290 A.2d 573 (D.C. Ct. App. 1972), aff'd on other grounds, 411 U.S. 389 (1973);
People v. Hoffman, 24 App. Div. 2d 497, 261 N.Y.S.2d 651 (2d Dep't 1965).
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tional it is necessary to demonstrate the applicability of the fourth
amendment'" to automobile stop cases." In order to trigger the pro-
tections of this amendment, two elements must coincide: one, that
a seizure occurred, and two, that it was unreasonable."
The basis for finding such an unreasonable seizure was
enunciated by the Supreme Court in Terry v. Ohio.'3 There, in
dealing with street encounters, a seizure was defined as occurring
when an officer "accosts an individual and restrains his freedom to
walk away."' 4 The Court was concerned with a balancing of the
governmental and individual interests, and therefore stated that to
justify such a seizure, "the police officer must be able to point to
specific and articulable facts, which, taken together with rational
inferences from those facts, reasonably warrant that intrusion."' 5
The step from a pedestrian detention to one involving an automo-
bile, however, has been the subject of much controversy.' 6
Prior to Terry, the Supreme Court had distinguished between
searches of one's home and automobile," and although it has still
never actually ruled on the applicability of Terry to automobiles, its
general approach demonstrates that this is the case.'" Nevertheless,
9. See generally Note, Warrantless Searches and Seizures of Automobiles, 87 HARV. L.
REV. 835 (1974); Note, Nonarrest Automobile Stops: Unconstitutional Seizures of the Person,
25 STAN. L. REv. 865 (1973); Note, Automobile License Checks and the Fourth Amendment,
60 VA. L. REV. 666 (1974).
10. The fourth amendment was made applicable to the states through the due process
clause of the fourteenth amendment in Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.§. 25 (1949). "The security
of one's privacy against arbitrary intrusion by the police-which is at the core of the Fourth
Amendment-is basic to a free society." Id. at 27.
11. See Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 461-62 (1971).
12. U.S. CONST. amend. IV. However, this amendment is not equivalent to a constitu-
tional "right of privacy," as its proscription is broader. It "protects individual privacy against
certain kinds of governmental intrusion, but its protections go further, and often have nothing
to do with privacy at all." Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 350 (1967).
13. 392 U.S. 1 (1968).
14. Id. at 16.
15. Id. at 21.
16. See generally Weisgall, Stop, Search and Seize: The Emerging Doctrine of Founded
Suspicion, 9 U. SAN FRAN. L. REv. 219, 237-41 (1974).
17. See Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132 (1925). The primary purpose of the fourth
amendment is "to prevent ... unlawful invasion of the sanctity of the home .... "Adams
v. New York, 192 U.S. 585, 598 (1904); accord, Almeida-Sanchez v. United States, 413 U.S.
266, 279 (1973). See generally Note, Mobility Reconsidered: Extending the Carroll Doctrine
to Movable Items, 58 IowA L. REv. 1134 (1973).
18. See, e.g., United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. 873, 878 (1975); Terry v. Ohio,
392 U.S. 1, 9 (1968); cf., United States v. Ortiz, 422 U.S. 891, 896 (1975); United States v.
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some lower courts have misconstrued the Supreme Court's failure
to specifically hold automobile stops to be directly within the pur-
view of the fourth amendment, 9 and have not applied that amend-
ment's provisions in such situations. 0 However, the more modern
approach is illustrated in United States v. Mallides.2' There the
Ninth Circuit reversed a conviction for transporting illegal aliens
where the defendant had been stopped without having violated any
traffic laws.2 The court stated:23
Although a pedestrian and an automobile driver are not in identical cir-
cumstances, we see no reason why similar Fourth Amendment standards
should not be applied in both situations. A person whose vehicle is stopped
by police and whose freedom to drive away is restrained is as effectively
"seized" as is the pedestrian who is detained.
III. Existing State Law Permitting Random Stops
The statutory requirements of most states with respect to random
stops are similar.2" Generally, they require the motorist to carrry and
produce his license and registration on the demand of an authorized
Cupps, 503 F.2d 277, 280 (6th Cir. 1974); Carpenter v. Sigler, 419 F.2d 169 (8th Cir. 1969).
19. [However,] [tihe States are not thereby precluded from developing workable
rules governing arrests, searches and seizures to meet 'the practical demands of effec-
tive criminal investigation and law enforcement' in the States, provided that those
rules do not violate the constitutional proscription of unreasonable searches and sei-
zures and the concomitant command that evidence so seized is inadmissible against
one who has standing to complain.
Ker v. California, 374 U.S. 23, 34 (1963).
20. Even prior to Terry, some courts had recognized similar types of seizures as falling
within the purview of the fourth amendment. Therefore, in order to determine the validity
of the stop, the interests of both the state and the individual must be balanced, and the stop
may not merely be made to harass the motorist. See, e.g., United States v. Bonanno, 180 F.
Supp. 71, 78-80 (S.D.N.Y. 1960).
Moreover, some courts attempt to justify their licensing statutes on the ground that driving
is a privilege granted to the citizens by the state, and is not an inherent right. Typical of these
is People v. Rosenheimer, 209 N.Y. 115, 102 N.E. 530 (1913). However, the reliance of the
court on the Supreme Court's holding in Otis v. Parker, 187 U.S. 606, 609 (1903) was abro-
gated by Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365, 374 (1971), where the Court stated that it "now
has rejected the concept that constitutional rights turn on whether a governmental benefit is
characterized as a 'right' or as a 'privilege.'
21. 473 F.2d 859 (9th Cir. 1973).
22. Id. at 862.
23. Id. at 861; accord, Carpenter v. Sigler, 419 F.2d 169, 171 (8th Cir. 1969).
24. However, California includes a reasonableness requirement in the statutory language
itself. CAL. VEHICLE CODE § 2806 (West 1971).
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official.25 Additionally, many statutes specifically give the police the
power to so request. 6
Even where there is no provision specifically granting the author-
ity to require such production, some courts have reasoned that this
power is implicit in the language of the statute itself. 7 Moreover,
many courts specifically state that the stop preliminary to the re-
quest does not amount to either a search or seizure,2" or an arrest,29
thereby circumventing the fourth amendment constitutional pro-
tections of the motorist.
For example, in Palmore v. United States,3 defendant was
stopped by the District of Columbia police, even though he had
committed no moving traffic violation, and his automobile appar-
ently had no equipment defects." Noticing that the car was a rental
similar to some recently stolen vehicles, the police stopped it for a
spot check. Defendant produced a valid driver's license and an ex-
pired rental agreement, which had been orally extended. As this was
occurring, one of the police officers noticed a pistol protruding from
the front seat of the car. After learning that it was unregistered, he
placed defendant under arrest. 2
Defendant argued that the police had "seized" 3 him within the
25. See, e.g., Aaiz. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 28-305(D), 28-423 (1956); D.C. CODE ENCYCL. ANN.
§ 40-104(a)(1), 40-301(c) (1968), as amended, (Supp. 1975); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 302.181(3)
(Vernon 1972); N.M. STAT. ANN. §§ 64-3-11, 64-13-49 (1972); N.Y. VEH. & TRAF. LAW § 401(4)
(McKinney 1970); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 75 § 614(b) (1971); cf. N.Y. VEH. & TRAF. LAW §
501(1)(e) (McKinney 1970).
26. See, e.g., NEB. REV. STAT. § 60-435(4) (1974); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 75 § 1221(a) (1971);
cf. Mo. ANN. STAT. §§ 43.160, 43.195 (Vernon 1969); N.Y. VEH. & TRAF. LAW §§ 390, 423(1)
(McKinney 1970); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 75 §§ 819(g), 834(g), 1221(b) (1971).
27. Many arguments have been raised for the preservation of this police authority, most
notably the lack of any other realistic mode by which to detect such violations. See, e.g.,
Palmore v. United States, 290 A.2d 573 (D.C. Ct. App. 1972), aff'd on other grounds, 411 U.S.
389 (1973); Lipton v. United States, 348 F.2d 591 (9th Cir. 1965); Commonwealth v. Mitchell,
355 S.W.2d 686 (Ky. App. 1962); State v. Holmberg, 194 Neb. 337, 231 N.W.2d 672 (1975).
28. See, e.g., Busby v. United States, 296 F.2d 328 (9th Cir. 1961), cert. denied, 369 U.S.
876 (1962); Commonwealth v. Hagan, 464 S.W.2d 261 (Ky. 1971); cf. Lipton v. United States,
348 F.2d 591 (9th Cir. 1965).
29. See, e.g., Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160, 188 (1949) (Jackson, J. dissenting);
Rodgers v. United States, 362 F.2d 358 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 993 (1966); Busby v.
United States, 296 F.2d 328 (9th Cir. 1961), cert. denied, 369 U.S. 876 (1962); Commonwealth
v. Hagan, 464 S.W.2d 261 (Ky. 1971).
30. 290 A.2d 573 (D.C. Ct. App. 1972), aff'd on other grounds, 411 U.S. 389 (1973).
31. Id. at 581.
32. Id.
33. See text accompanying notes 9-14 supsa.
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meaning of the fourth amendment and could not at that time point
to the "specific and articulable facts" required by Terry. 4 The gov-
ernment, however, contended that the police had a statutory right
and duty to stop an automobile without having even reasonable
suspicion. 5 The court decided that these two apparently opposing
positions were not irreconcilable."
In affirming the conviction, the court held that stops to determine
compliance with the District of Columbia Code are "not so unrea-
sonable as to be violative of the fourth amendment."3 Although
cautioning against use of the Code as a mere subterfuge for other-
wise unconstitutional stops,3" it held that after the production of the
required documents, the police must release the driver immediately,
and that it is only at this specific point that the relevant safeguards
enunciated by the Supreme Court in Terry become applicable. 9
However, the holding of the Palmore court is now questionable be-
cause of its failure to recognize that the defendant was effectively
"seized" at the time of his initial stop by the police.4"
Cases following Palmore have usually employed a balancing pro-
cess in which the governmental and individual interests are
weighed." The rationale of the court in State ex rel. Berger v.
Cantor2 is illustrative of this balancing process. Defendant was
driving an old, dirty car when he was stopped by the highway patrol
34. 392 U.S. at 21. See text accompanying note 15 supra.
35. 290 A.2d at 581-82; see D.C. CODE ENCYCL. ANN. §§ 40-104(a)(1), 40-301(c) (1968), as
amended, (Supp. 1975).
36. 290 A.2d at 582.
37. Id.
38. Id.; see cases cited in note 6 supra.
39. 290 A.2d at 583.
40. See, e.g., United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. 873 (1975). "The Fourth Amend-
ment applies to all seizures of the person, including seizures that involve only a brief deten-
tion short of traditional arrest." Id. at 878.
However, as was noted in United States v. Nicholas, 448 F.2d 622 (8th Cir. 1971) (see text
accompanying notes 61-67 infra):
In determining whether the seizure . . . violated his Fourth Amendment rights, we
are required, under Terry, to make a dual inquiry:
(1) whether the officers' action was justified at its inception, and
(2) whether it was reasonably related in scope to the circumstances which justified
the interferences in the first place.
Id. at 624 (emphasis added).
41. See cases cited in note 4 supra.
42. 13 Ariz. App. 555, 479 P.2d 432 (Div. 1 1970).
[Vol. IV
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for a license and registration check.43 As he opened the glove com-
partment to procure the registration, the officer observed a kilogram
of marijuana and arrested him." The Arizona Court of Appeals
concluded that this stop was a permissible exercise of the state's
police power, due to its interest in maintaining highway safety.45
In this balancing process, the most forceful argument advanced
for the state is that there is no other practical method of guarantee-
ing compliance with the relevant vehicle and traffic regulations.
Palmore reasoned that a limitation on this power to stop motor
vehicles would make prevention of violations virtually impossible,
since people driving in disregard of licensing and registration regula-
tions would not demonstrate the required conduct for the existence
of an "articulable suspicion," and would therefore gain effective
immunity."
Many courts have adopted this type of reasoning4" to hold that
there existed such a blanket right on the part of the police," even
43. Id. at 556, 479 P.2d at 433; see ARIZ. REv. STAT. ANN. §§ 28-305(d), 28-423 (1956).
44. 13 Ariz. App. at 556, 479 P.2d at 433.
45. Id. at 558, 479 P.2d at 435; cf. United States v. Riggs, 347 F. Supp. 1098, 1102-03
(E.D.N.Y. 1972), aff'd, 474 F.2d 699 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 820 (1973).
Subsequently, Division 2 of the Arizona Court of Appeals, noting the apparent split in
authority between the two divisions, stated that these stops were constitutional only when
the police had a "rational suspicion" that the person was involved in some unusual activity
which was connected to crime. State v. Ochoa, 23 Ariz. App. 510, -, 534 P.2d 441, 444-45
(Div. 2, 1975). Although such a test is initially equivalent to the "suspicious circumstances"
stated in United States v. Nicholas, 448 F.2d 622 (8th Cir. 1971), it is still questionable as to
which course will finally be adopted as controlling in Arizona. See text accompanying notes
61-67 infra.
46. 290 A.2d at 582; accord, Lipton v. United States, 348 F.2d 591 (9th Cir. 1965); Com-
monwealth v. Mitchell, 355 S.W.2d 686 (Ky. App. 1962); State v. Holmberg, 194 Neb. 337,
231 N.W.2d 672 (1975); People v. Dozier, 52 Misc. 2d 631, 276 N.Y.S.2d 145 (Oneida County
Ct. 1967). Moreover, in Holmberg, the court stated: "It would be most unusual to have an
observable indication of a licensing violation of a moving vehicle. Stopping the vehicles for
inspection is the only practical method of enforcement . 194 Neb. at -, 231 N.W.2d
at 675.
47. For an argument in the opposite extreme, see note 71 infra.
48. See cases cited in note 1 supra. The New York decisions in this area are of special
interest, as following the decision of People v. Battle, 12 N.Y.2d 866, 187 N.E.2d 793, 237
N.Y.S.2d 341 (1962), the lower New York courts consistently held that the police had a
virtually unlimited right to arbitrarily stop automobiles in order to determine compliance
with the statute, even though the Court of Appeals did not speak on the issue until People v.
Cantor, 36 N.Y.2d 106, 324 N.E.2d 872, 365 N.Y.S.2d 509 (1975), and People v. Ingle, 36
N.Y.2d 413, 330 N.E.2d 39, 369 N.Y.S.2d 67 (1975). See, e.g., People v. Jeffries, 45 App. Div.
2d 6, 355 N.Y.S.2d 878 (4th Dep't 1974); People v. Denti, 44 App. Div. 2d 44, 353 N.Y.S.2d
10 (1st Dep't.1974); People v. Baer, 37 App. Div. 2d 150, 322 N.Y.S.2d 534 (3d Dep't 1971);
334 FORDHAM URBAN LA W JOURNAL [Vol. IV
though the factual situation provided the officers involved with
probable cause or reasonable suspicion upon which they could have
made such a stop.4" In People v. Hoffman,5' the police stopped de-
fendant due to his suspicious activities in operating his car at four
o'clock in the morning, and found stolen license plates in it.', In
denying his motion to suppress this evidence, the court stated that
such a stop was justified by the defendant's actions.52 However, this
People v. Merola, 30 App. Div. 2d 963, 294 N.Y.S.2d 301 (2d Dep't 1968); People v. Kopo-
sesky, 25 App. Div. 2d 777, 269 N.Y.S.2d 484 (2d Dep't 1966); People v. Hoffman, 24 App.
Div. 2d 497, 261 N.Y.S.2d 651 (2d Dep't 1965); People v. Scianno, 20 App. Div. 2d 919, 249
N.Y.S.2d 456 (2d Dep't 1964); People v. Dozier, 52 Misc. 2d 631, 276 N.Y.S.2d 145 (Oneida
County Ct. 1967); People v. Russo, 38 Misc. 2d 957, 239 N.Y.S.2d 374 (New York City Ct.
1963).
49. The justification for permitting such stops in these situations was amply stated in
State v. Fish, 280 Minn. 163, 159 N.W.2d 786 (1968) (defendant stopped driving away from
a bar at 2:30 a.m. after police received a report it had been burglarized). The court stated
that "[p]ersons found under suspicious circumstances are not clothed with a right of privacy
which prevents law-enforcement officers from inquiring as to their identity and actions." Id.
at 167, 159 N.W.2d at 789; accord, United States v. Lara, 517 F.2d 209 (5th Cir. 1975) (citing
factors of United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. 873 (1975), for finding reasonable suspi-
cion for a search); United States v. Fallon, 457 F.2d 15 (10th Cir. 1972) (stopped since the
occupants of a Jeep station wagon appeared young and the vehicle was new and expensive);
Welch v. United States, 361 F.2d 214 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 876 (1966) (defendant
was.stopped since he was driving slowly and weaving as if drunk); Santos v. Bayley, 400 F.
Supp. 784 (M.D. Pa. 1975) (defendants stopped in response to a police broadcast identifying
their van as one suspected of transporting marijuana); State v. Cobuzzi, 161 Conn. 371, 288
A.2d 439 (1971), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 1017 (1972) (defendant was stopped after driving in a
circuitous route in a commercial district area in the early morning); People v. Miezio, 103
Ill. App. 2d 398, 242 N.E.2d 795 (2d Dist. 1968) (defendant stopped since he had no license
plates); State v. Valstad, 282 Minn. 301, 165 N.W.2d 19 (1969), citing State v. Fish, supra;
People v. Merola, 30 App. Div. 2d 963, 294 N.Y.S.2d 301 (2d Dep't 1968); (defendant stopped
by police while running to a parked car with its motor on and a number of coats on the back
seat); cf. People v. Rivera, 14 N.Y.2d 441, 201 N.E.2d 32, 252 N.Y.S.2d 458 (1964), cert.
denied, 379 U.S. 978 (1965) (police stopped and frisked defendants after watching them walk
back and forth in front of a bar and-grill at 1:30 a.m., and walk away rapidly after seeing
police). But see Dodge v. Turner, 274 F. Supp. 285 (D. Utah 1967) (no probable cause to arrest
defendant after police officer saw him lean over in his car as if he were putting something
under the seat); People v. Diaz, 36 Misc. 2d 195, 232 N.Y.S.2d 208 (New York City Ct. 1962)
(no probable cause to stop defendant driving up and down the same street, an action which
the police had thought suspicious).
The Supreme Court has recently upheld the constitutionality of such "suspicious individ-
ual" stops, reasoning that "in order to determine his identity or to maintain the status quo
momentarily while obtaining more information, [such a brief stop] may be most reasonable
in light of the facts known to the officer at the time." Adams v. Williams, 407 U.S. 143, 146
(1972) (citations omitted).
50. 24 App. Div. 2d 497, 261 N.Y.S.2d 651 (2d Dep't 1965).
51. Id. at 498, 261 N.Y.S.2d at 653.
52. Id.
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was not until the court had first stated in universal language that
it was "clear that the arresting officer was lawfully authorized to
stop" defendant and demand production of the documents required
to be carried by the statute.5
3
Other courts have been faced with the issue of routine stops at
fixed checkpoints.54 It is generally easier to justify such a stop,55
since the element of arbitrariness is removed,5" and the discretion
of the state to intrude is considerably lessened. 7 In these cases, the
police do not randomly choose to stop a particular driver,5" and any
chance of discrimination at the whim of the officers involved is
therefore removed. Unless such a universal procedure were held to
be unconstitutional, its application would be upheld.5"
IV. Evolving Law
In answer to the arguments raised against permitting arbitrary
stops, a trend developed whereby the police were required to have
more than naked statutory power to conduct such "routine traffic
checks." To some extent, the foundation for this was laid in the
various caveats and exclusions the courts devised to prevent the
total abuse of this authority. 0 However, its real inception may be
traced to the decision of the Eighth Circuit in United States v.
Nicholas."'
There, three St. Louis City police officers were patrolling an area
known for its high volume of narcotic trafficking, and observed a
53. Id.
54. See State v. Kabayama, 98 N.J. Super. 85, 236 A.2d 164 (App. Div. 1967), aff'd, 52
N.J. 507, 246 A.2d 714 (1968).
55. See, e.g., United States v. Hart, 506 F.2d 887, 895 (5th Cir.), vacated, 422 U.S. 1053
(1975).
56. See, e.g., United States v. Bowen, 500 F.2d 960 (9th Cir. 1974), aff'd, 422 U.S. 916
(1975); State v. Smolen, 4 Conn. Cir. 385, 232 A.2d 339 (App. Div.), appeal denied, 155 Conn.
720, 231 A.2d 283 (1967), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 1044 (1968); cf. United States v. Bonanno,
180 F. Supp. 71 (S.D.N.Y. 1960).
57. See, e.g., United States v. Croft, 429 F.2d 884, 886 (10th Cir. 1970).
58. Cf. People v. Kuhn, 33 N.Y.2d 203, 208, 306 N.E.2d 777, 779, 351 N.Y.S.2d 649, 652
(1973). Although speaking of magnatometer searches at airports, the rationale used by the
court is the same as that used in differentiating checkpoint from arbitrary stops.
59. But see United States v. Ortiz, 422 U.S. 891 (1975). "We therefore . . . hold that at
traffic checkpoints removed from the border and its functional equivalents, [Border Patrol]
officers may not search private vehicles without consent or probable cause." Id. at 896-97.
60. See cases cited in note 6 supra.
61. 448 F.2d 622 (8th Cir. 1971); accord, United States v. Mallides, 473 F.2d 859 (9th Cir.
1973).
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Cadillac with out-of-state plates in a parking lot. After seeing a
black man enter, they stopped it to ascertain the registration, and
to question his presence in that neighborhood. Upon smelling burn-
ing marijuana, they arrested the defendant; in a search of the car,
they found stolen cashier's checks in the trunk. 2
In reversing his conviction for possession of the checks, the court
held that the police were only acting upon a generalized suspicion
that any black person in such a position would be engaged in some
sort of prohibited activity. 3 The court reasoned that the intrusion
on fourth amendment rights could not be predicated on "such scant
basis." 4
In answer to the government's contention that the police were
merely complying with Missouri law giving them the authority to
check licenses, 5 the court explicitly stated: "Our examination of
Missouri law indicates that there is no general power, either by
virtue of statute or common law, to approach the driver of any
vehicle absent suspicious circumstances.""
This requirement of "suspicious circumstances" is the first in-
stance of a substantive limitation being placed upon the power of
the police to stop vehicles arbitrarily under the relevant vehicle and
traffic laws. This same rationale was utilized by the Pennsylvania
Supreme Court in Commonwealth v. Swanger.68 There, the defen-
62. 448 F.2d at 623.
63. Id. at 625.
64. Id.; accord, United States v. Rias, 524 F.2d 118, 121 (5th Cir. 1975).
65. 448 F.2d at 626; see Mo. ANN. Stat. §§ 43.160, 43.195, 302.181(3) (Vernon 1969).
66. 448 F.2d at 626 n.5.
67. See State v. Rankin, 477 S.W.2d 72 (Mo. Sup. Ct. 1972). The court held that: "It is
clear that an officer has a right to stop an automobile to make a routine check for an operator's
license." Id. at 75, citing United States v. Turner, 442 F.2d 1146 (8th Cir. 1971). However,
the court's reliance on Turner is incorrect for two reasons, aside from the later law laid down
in Nicholas. First, the police in Turner stopped the car for a routine check only after they
noticed its punched out trunk lock (which would then meet even the 'suspicious circumstan-
ces' test subsequently stated by Nicholas). Second, the power of the police to stop for a
routine check for an operator's license in Turner was conceded by the parties. 442 F.2d at
1147. In reference to such concessions made as to the power of the police to make such stops,
see United States v. Croft, 429 F.2d 884 (10th Cir. 1970). Although there the court was dealing
with a roadblock stop, it may well have foreshadowed the decisions against these arbitrary
stops. Finding a lawful stop, the court emphasized that "[diefendant was not singled out
for this check but was simply the first car stopped." Id. at 886.
68. 300 A.2d 66 (Pa.), aff'd on rehearing, 453 Pa. 107, 307 A.2d 875 (1973). The court
granted the petition for reargument of the attorney general, and then reiterated its prior
decision to reverse appellant's conviction. 453 Pa. at 109, 307 A.2d at 875.
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dant was stopped for a routine check by the state police, and did
not have an operator's license or valid registration as required by
•law. 9 After shining a flashlight through the window of the car, the
police officer noticed burglar's tools and arrested defendant on that
charge. He was subsequently convicted of burglary.7"
The court was concerned with the adverse effect an extension of
the power would have7 on fourth amendment rights.7" In accord
with the standards of Terry the court required " 'specific and ar-
ticulable facts' which had led them [the police] reasonably to con-
clude that either the automobile or its driver were not properly
licensed . ... 7
In its analysis, the court reiterated that an automobile is a place
where a person reasonably expects privacy,74 and also asserted that
the police officer had effectively "'seized' that automobile and its
passengers."" This decision then establishes that the state interest
served by such traffic checks must be subordinated to the right of
the individual to be left alone.76 Hence, the true value of Swanger
is its explicit statement that fourth amendment rights are not sub-
ject to the whim of police officers, even when such power is invoked
under legislative authority.77
Following this trend, the New York Court of Appeals recently held
69. Id. at 67. See PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 75 § 614(b) (1971).
70. 300 A.2d at 67-68.
71. Although the court noted the validity of the state's argument for deterrence, it took
such a position to its extreme. The court pointed out that this logic would permit exactly
those unconstitutional seizures which the Supreme Court prohibited in Terry. 300 A.2d at
69.
72. U.S. CONST. amend. IV. See 47 TEMPLE L.Q. 640 (1974).
73. 300 A.2d at 70; see Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968). "Anything less,[than 'specific
and articulable facts'] would invite intrusions upon constitutionally guaranteed rights based
on nothing more substantial than inarticulate hunches, a result this Court has consistently
refused to sanction." Id. at 22 (citations omitted).
74. 300 A.2d at 68; see Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 9 (1968); Katz v. United States, 389
U.S. 347, 359 (1967); Henry v. United States, 361 U.S. 98, 104 (1959).
75. 300 A.2d at 68; 453 Pa. at 111, 307 A.2d at 877.
76. Cf. Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132, 153-54 (1925).
77. This is even more significant when it is realized that the Circuit Court for the District
of Columbia considered virtually the same rights in Palmore, but arrived at a contrary
decision. See text accompanying notes 30-40 supra.
Although the Pennsylvania court has generally adhered to its rule stated in Swanger, see,
e.g., Commonwealth v. Murray, 331 A.2d 414 (Pa. 1975), some doubt as to following the policy
Swanger was expressing was reflected by the dissent in Glass v. Commonwealth, 333 A.2d
768 (Pa. 1975).
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in People v. Ingle"8 that a true balancing of governmental and indi-
vidual interests requires the elimination of any arbitrariness in the
enforcement of the motor vehicle statute."9 Although systematic
routine checks of automobiles are permitted, other types of unjusti-
fied stops are "impermissible intrusion[s] on the freedom of move-
ment. '"
In Ingle, defendant was driving a 1949 Ford with no apparent
defects and was violating no traffic laws. He was stopped for a
routine traffic check and produced his license and registration as
required by statute." Defendant consented to the trooper's exami-
nation of a small wire screen on the floor, and of a pouch, which
contained marijuana and various smoking implements. Defendant
was arrested, and after his suppression motion was denied, he
pleaded guilty to a reduced charge."
In vacating his conviction, ordering suppression, and dismissing
the indictment, the court clearly noted that the facts required to
permit such routine traffic checks are minimal. As long as the stop
was based on the "specific and articulable facts" as stated in
Terry, 4 then the "minor intrusion" caused to the motorist must be
subordinated to the interest of the State to maintain highway
safety. 5 However, where the arbitrary intrusion on individual free-
dom is maximized, then this discretion must be restricted. Hence,
even the statutory language permitting these inspections cannot be
utilized so as
78. 36 N.Y.2d 413, 330 N.E.2d 39, 369 N.Y.S.2d 67 (1975).
79. Id. at 419, 330 N.E.2d at 43, 369 N.Y.S.2d at 73.
80. Id. at 416, 330 N.E.2d at 41, 369 N.Y.S.2d at 70.
81. Id. at 415, 330 N.E.2d at 40, 369 N.Y.S.2d at 69-70. See, N.Y. VEH. & TRAF. LAW §§
401(4), 501(1)(e) (McKinney 1970).
82. 36 N.Y.2d at 415-16, 330 N.E.2d at 40-41, 369 N.Y.S.2d at 69-70.
83. Id. at 420, 330 N.E.2d at 44, 369 N.Y.S.2d at 74.
84, 392 U.S. at 21; see People v. Cantor, 36 N.Y.2d 106, 324 N.E.2d 872, 365 N.Y.S.2d
509 (1975) (decided less than two months before Ingle). The court held that the "proscrip-
tion against unreasonable searches and seizures is designed to prevent random, unjustified
interference with private citizens whether it is denominated an arrest, investigatory deten-
tion, or field interrogation." Id. at 112, 324 N.E.2d at 876, 365 N.Y.S.2d at 515 (citations
omitted). The court also discussed the requirement of "founded suspicion" to effectuate a
detentive stop under the New York "stop and frisk" statute. Id. at 114, 324 N.E.2d at 878,
365 N.Y.S.2d at 517. See N.Y. CRIM. PRO. LAW. § 140.50 (McKinney 1971).
85. 36 N.Y.2d at 420, 330 N.E.2d at 44, 369 N.Y.S.2d at 74.
86. Id. at 419, 330 N.E.2d at 43, 369 N.Y.S.2d at 73-74.
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to authorize a stop by the shibboleth of a 'routine traffic check,' if such a stop
is gratuitous, arbitrary, and without justification or excuse to support even
that limited intrusion on movement on the highways."
Thus, these courts have articulated three tests to justify such
routine stops: the "suspicious circumstances" of Nicholas; the
"probable cause based on specific facts" of Swanger; and the "non-
arbitrariness" of Ingle. Each is an attempt to formulate a practical
rule whereby the individual's constitutional rights will be protected
and the power of the police to meet their duty of enforcing the
statutory regulations will not be unduly restricted.88
The Supreme Court has spoken, peripherally, to the issue of ran-
dom stops. Almeida-Sanchez v. United States8 involved the stop-
ping of defendant by a roving Border Patrol looking for illegal al-
iens, 0 twenty-five air miles north of the Mexican border." The car
was thoroughly searched, large quantities of marijuana were found,
and the defendant was convicted.2 Although the Border Patrol
admittedly had no warrant and no probable cause for the search, 3
the stop was conducted under authority granted by the Immigration
and Naturalization Act."
In reversing the conviction, the Court stated that the stop and
87. Id. at 418, 330 N.E.2d at 42, 369 N.Y.S.2d at 72.
88. It is significant to note that these decisions viewed the rights of the individual as
paramount, instead of attempting to circumvent them, or to somehow fit them in between
the statutory grants of police power. See text accompanying notes 27-29 supra.
89. 413 U.S. 266 (1973).
90. See 8 U.S.C. § 1324(a)(2) (1970). See generally Note, Border Searches and the Fourth
Amendment, 77 YALE L.J. 1007 (1968).
91. However, the road'defendant was travelling did not itself reach the border. 413 U.S.
at 267.
92. Id. at 267. For discussions of Almeida-Sanchez, see Tribe, The Supreme Court 1972
Term, 87 HARV. L. REV. 1, 196 (1973) Note, Almeida-Sanchez and its Progeny: The Develop-
ing Border Zone Search Law, 17 AMz. L. REv. 214 (1975); Note, Area Search Warrants in
Border Zones: Almeida-Sanchez and Camara, 84 YALE L.J. 355 (1974); 1973 WASH. U.L.Q.,
889.
93. 413 U.S. at 268.
94. Id. 8 U.S.C. § 1357(a) (1970) provides in pertinent part:
Any officer or employee of the [Immigration and Naturalization] Service . . . shall
have power without warrant . . . (3) within a reasonable distance from any external
boundary of the United States, to board and search for aliens . . . for the purpose of
patrolling the border to prevent the illegal entry of aliens into the United States . ...
8 C.F.R. § 287.1(a) (2) (1976) provides in pertinent part:
The term 'reasonable distance' . . . means within 100 air miles from any external
boundary of the United States or any shorter distance which may be fixed by the
district director . ...
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search were not conducted at the border or its functional equivalent,
and that the provisions of the Act itself did not justify it. Since there
was no probable cause for the search, it abridged the defendant's
fourth amendment rights. 5
This decision, although directed at Border Patrol agents,9" dem-
onstrates the unwillingness of the Supreme Court to permit unfet-
tered discretion of police in their random stopping of vehicles. The
thrust of Nicholas, Swanger, Ingle, and now Almeida-Sanchez is
clearly that some curtailment must be placed on the power of the
police in this area, to prevent the abuse of that authority, and the
abrogation of the constitutional rights of those citizens involved.
This rule was later expanded by the Court in United States v.
BrignoniPonce11 There, defendant was stopped by a roving Border
Patrol" solely because the three occupants of the car appeared to
be of Mexican ancestry. After learning that the passengers were
illegal aliens, the officer arrested the three occupants, and charged
defendant with knowingly transporting illegal immigrants." After
the trial court denied his motion to suppress the testimony of the
two aliens, and permitted them to testify, defendant was convicted
of both counts.' 0
The Supreme Court also concerned itself with a balancing of the
interests involved. On the one hand was the government's "convinc-
ing demonstration that the public interest demands effective mea-
95. 413 U.S. at 273. However, Mr. Justice White, in his dissent, felt that the stopping of
defendant's car, under these circumstances was reasonable. Id. at 285. In United States v.
Foerster, 455 F.2d 981 (9th Cir. 1972), vacated, 413 U.S. 915 (1973) it had been stated: "This
court has consistently upheld the right of Immigration officers to stop and investigate vehicles
for concealed aliens, as was done here, without a showing of probable cause." Id. at 981.
96. For a discussion of border and related searches, see Note, In Search of the Border:
Searches Conducted by Federal Customs and Immigration Officers, 5 N.Y.U. J. INT'L. L. &
POLITICS 93 (1972).
97. 422 U.S. 873 (1975).
98. In fact, the Border Patrol operated fixed check points in Southern California, but on
the night in question this one was closed due to the weather, and the officers were simply
observing the northbound traffic from their car parked on the highway. The Ninth Circuit
Court of Appeals had held that the stop more closely resembled a roving-patrol stop rather
than that of a checkpoint, and the government did not challenge this conclusion. Id. at 874-
76.
99. This is a violation of 8 U.S.C. § 1324(a)(2) (1970).
100. 422 U.S. at 875. As the Court noted, this case was different from Almeida-Sanchez
"in that the Border Patrol does not claim authority to search cars, but only to question the
occupants about their citizenship and immigration status." Id. at 874.
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sures to control the illegal entry of aliens." 101 On the other was the
"interference with individual liberty that results when an officer
stops an automobile and questions its occupants."'' 2 The rights of
the individual were found to be paramount. 3
On its facts, the case may not be determinative of the entire issue.
Indeed, in dictum, the Court stated that Brignoni-Ponce did not
preclude the states from "conduct[ing] such limited stops as are
necessary""1 4 to enforce their motor vehicle provisions. However, the
101. Id. at 878. Specifically, they cited figures of the Immigration and Naturalization
Service which stated that there are up to ten to twelve million illegal aliens in the United
States, approximately 85% of whom are from Mexico. Id. The Court also discussed the social
and policy considerations of such a problem. Id.; see id. at 899 (Burger, C.J., concurring);
Id. at 900 (app.). See also Note, supra note 96.
102. 422 U.S. at 879. Moreover, since the stop was usually of no more than one minute,
and involved no search, the court felt it was modest and could be justified on a basis less
than the probable cause required for an arrest. Id. at 880.
103. Id. at 883-84. The Court was concerned with the relatively unlimited discretion of
the Border Patrol agents in this area, as well as the concommitant interference a different
holding would place on highway usage. Id.
104.
Our decision in this case takes into account the special function of the Border Patrol,
the importance of the governmental interest in policing the border area, the character
of roving-patrol stops, and the availability of alternatives to random stops unsupported
by reasonable suspicion. Border Patrol agents have no part in enforcing laws that
regulate highway use, and their activities have nothing to do with an inquiry whether
motorists and their vehicles are entitled, by virtue of compliance with laws governing
highway usage, to be upon the public highways. Our decision thus does not imply that
state and local enforcement agencies are without power to conduct such limited stops
as are necessary to enforce laws regarding driver's licenses, vehicle registration, truck
weights, and similar matters.
Id. at 883 n.8 (emphasis added). This footnote has subsequently become significant as a
means for allegedly circumventing the Court's holding. See text accompanying notes 111-38
infra. Although the practical invalidity of utilizing such an exclusion approach does not
appear justified (see text accompanying notes 136-138 infra), the concurring opinion of Mr.
Justice Rehnquist seems to indicate that it may be.
[Al strong case may be made for those charged with the enforcement of laws
conditioning the right of vehicular use of a highway to likewise stop motorists using
highways in order to determine whether they have met the qualifications prescribed
by applicable law for such use. I regard these and similar situations, such as agricul-
tural inspections and highway roadblocks to apprehend known fugitives, as not in any
way constitutionally suspect by reason of today's decision.
Id. at 887-88. (citations omitted). However, this is somewhat mitigated by the concurring
opinion of Mr. Justice White, joined by Mr. Justice Blackman.
The Court purports to leave the question open, but it seems to me, my Brother
Rehnquist notwithstanding, that under the Court's opinions checkpoint investigative
stops, without search, will be difficult to justify under the Fourth Amendment absent
probable cause or reasonable suspicion.
Id. at 914-15.
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thrust of the decision, as well as this limiting language of the Court,
indicates that the policies of Brignoni-Ponce would be negated by
limiting its holding to the specific facts of the case.
Moreover, the Court was concerned with powers and policies dif-
ferent from those previously considered, and hence different weights
may have been attached to these various factors.0 5 Under the state
vehicle and traffic laws, the legislature attempts to insure public
safety on the roads and to detect violations of the statutes. Under
the Immigration and Nationality Act,' °0 the Border Patrol attempts
to control the flow of illegal aliens. The difference of degree between
these two policies is evident. The federal government is attempting
to prevent the furtherance of an already serious problem in the
country, which causes marked hardships in areas such as employ-
ment, housing, and welfare.' 7 The states, however, are merely at-
tempting to compel obedience to a statutory determination of high-
way safety.'08
Additionally, the powers of the agents under each enactment are
different. Many state statutes do not specifically authorize the offi-
cer to stop automobiles in order to determine compliance, although
this power is often considered necessarily implicit in the operation
of the system.'00 Under the Immigration and Nationality Act, how-
ever, the agents are given the explicit power to "board and search"
motor vehicles."10
Thus, the Supreme Court faced federal governmental interests
more important than those of the state, and a Congressional grant
of power which was much broader in its scope. Nevertheless, the
Court still held that personal freedoms outweighed these factors in
the balancing process.
105. For a discussion of the practices and duties of state officers as opposed to federal
agents, see Cady v. Dombrowski, 413 U.S. 433 (1973).
106. See note 94 supra. The Court specifically stated that it was limiting the authority of
the Border Patrol in situations away from the border and its functional equivalents. In those
areas, the officers are also effectively subjected to the Terry standards of specific and articula-
ble facts. 422 U.S. at 884. See text accompanying note 15 supra.
107. See note 103 supra.
108. Although this comparison is in no way attempting to demean the significance of
such provisions, when viewed against the recognized national problems created by illegal
aliens, they must surely be subordinated. See, e.g., State v. Holmberg, 194 Neb. 337, -,
231 N.W.2d 672, 680 (1975) (McCown, J., dissenting).
109. See statutes and cases cited in notes 25-27 supra.
110. See note 94 supra.
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V. Qualifications on the Evolving Law
Although Brignoni-Ponce is in agreement with the trend demon-
strated by Nicholas, Swanger, Ingle, and Almeida-Sanchez, it has
thus far been limited to Border Patrol and related stops."' Some
decisions continue to allow arbitrary stops in enforcing vehicle and
traffic laws.
In State v. Holmberg,' defendant, stopped by a state trooper
solely for a license and registration check, was arrested after discov-
ery of drugs in his camper."3 In affirming the conviction," 4 the Ne-
braska Supreme Court rejected"' the argument that a "reasonable
cause" requirement"' be read into the Nebraska statute."' Rather,
the court interpreted the statute as giving officers authority to en-
force the vehicle and traffic laws"8 without any limitation save that
of using it as a pretext for other purposes."' The Court specifically
111. However, other cases following Brignoni-Ponce have demonstrated that the rationale
of the Court expressed therein will be followed. See, e.g., United States v. Ogilvie, No. 74-
3487 (9th Cir., Sept. 15, 1975) where, treating the stop of defendant's car as one of "roving
patrol," the court held that the "reasonable suspicion, founded on articulable facts" standard
enunciated in Brignoni-Ponce was applicable, and it had not been met; and Illinois Migrant
Council v. Pilliod, 398 F. Supp. 882 (N.D. Ill. 1975) where the court issued the requested
preliminary injunction, holding a fortiori from Brignoni-Ponce that agents of the Immigra-
tion and Naturalization Service could not constitutionally stop an automobile merely be-
cause its occupants appeared to be of Mexican ancestry. Cf. United States v. Soria, 519 F.2d
1060 (5th Cir. 1975) which held, aside from the border search decisions of the Supreme
Court, that Customs Agents also do not have unfettered discretion. See also United States
v. Rocha-Lopez, No. 74-2601 (9th Cir., Dec. 8, 1975); United States v. Lara, 517 F.2d 209
(5th Cir. 1975) (there existed reasonable suspicion for the stop, under the factors noted by
the Supreme Court) United States v. Byrd, 520 F.2d 1101 (5th Cir. 1975) (speaking in rela-
tion to permanent checkpoints).
112. 194 Neb. 337, 231 N.W.2d 672 (1975).
113. Id. at -' 231 N.W.2d at 674.
114. Id. at -, 231 N.W.2d at 674-75.
115. Id. at __, 231 N.W.2d at 675.
116. See, e.g. CALIF. VEHICLE CODE § 2806 (West 1971).
117. See, e.g., NEB. REV. STAT. 60-435(4) (1974).
118. 194 Neb. at , 231 N.W.2d at 675.
119. Id. at -, 231 N.W.2d at 678. The court also had an interesting philosophy con-
cerning such random stops. It felt spot checks were less inconvenient to motorists, and also
were more advantageous due to their element of surprise. Hence, the court concluded that
that they were "not only more practical but can have a salutary effect on the enforcement of
our traffic laws and serve to promote the safety of the travelling public." Id. at -, 231
N.W.2d at 675. But cf., United States v. Ortiz, 422 U.S. 891, 895 (1975), where the Court
stated that the reasonableness requirement of the fourth amendment "also may limit
police use of unnecessarily frightening or offensive methods of surveillance and investiga-
tion."; accord, United States v. Hart, 506 F.2d 887, 895 (5th Cir.), vacated, 422 U.S. 1053
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ruled out the applicability of Brignoni-Ponce due to the Court's
apparently limiting language. 10
The dissent, however, interpreted Brignoni-Ponce as controlling,'
and noted the total abrogation of constitutional rights that the ma-
jority's decision necessarily implies.' In effect, the decision makes
the
mere pronouncement of the magic words "I wanted to check the registration
and driver's license" . . . the "open sesame" which removes all constitu-
tional barriers to a random investigative stop of any motor vehicle at any
time, any place, at the arbitrary whim of any police officer.'
A recent Tenth Circuit case, United States v. Jenkins,"4 also
ignores the thrust of Brignoni-Ponce. In Jenkins, defendant was
randomly stopped'25 for a routine check' 6 while driving in New Mex-
ico with out of state plates. The officer, upon learning that the
automobile was stolen, arrested the defendant who was subse-
quently found guilty of interstate transportation of a stolen motor
vehicle. The court of appeals affirmed the conviction. 2 '
The court stated"'s that this case was governed by United States
(1975). Hence, unless the court in Holmberg is consciously advocating some form of uncon-
stitutional ubiquitous intimidation of its own citizens, the practical application of such a
policy is questionable.
120. 194 Neb. at -, 231 N.W.2d at 678; see note 104 supra and accompanying text.
121. 194 Neb. at _ , 231 N.W.2d at 680-81 (McCown, J., dissenting).
122. Permitting such stops without any standard of articulable suspicion effectively "re-
peals the Fourth Amendment by statutory fiat." Id. at -, 231 N.W.2d at 679.
123. Id. at - , 231 N.W.2d at 679-80. The dissent also discussed the relevancy of United
States v. Bell, 383 F. Supp. 1298 (D. Neb. 1974), which the majority opinion apparently
disregards. 194 Neb. at -' 231 N.W.2d at 679-80. In Bell the defendant was stopped for
an allegedly defective front license plate (which was later determined not to be faulty), and
he produced his license and registration. The officer smelled marijuana, and a subsequent
search uncovered 904 pounds. In granting defendant's motion to suppress this evidence, the
court found this practice of stopping vehicles pursuant to the statute, NEB. REV. STAT. § 60-
435 (1974), "intolerable and unreasonable." 383 F. Supp. at 1302. The court, however, de-
clined to rule on the constitutionality of this statute in deference to the Nebraska Supreme
Court, although it specifically noted that it would "narrowly construe" the statute, so as to
require a "founded and reasonable suspicion" on the part of the officer, in order to justify
such stops. Id. at 1303.
124. No. 74-1567 (10th Cir., Aug. 14, 1975).
125. The officer stated that there was nothing unusual or suspicious about the vehicle or
its driver, and it was customary for him to make fifteen to twenty such stops daily. Id. at 2.
126. Id. See N.M. STAT. ANN. 64-3-11, 64-13-49 (1972).
127. No. 74-1567, at 7.
128. Id. at 4.
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v. Lepinski'5 which affirmed defendant's conviction for interstate
transportation of a firearm, discovered after he was stopped for a
routine traffic check. The court attempted to distinguish13 the later
case of United States v. McDevitt.3' That decision reversed a mari-
juana conviction because of the circumstances of the arrest which
included a random stop. 3 ' Jenkins noted that in McDevitt the po-
lice inquiry continued even after defendant had correctly produced
the required papers, while in both Jenkins and Lepinski such docu-
ments were not offered.'33 This distinction is questionable since
McDevitt did direct its attention to the justification for the initial
stop. Although it did not specifically overrule Lepinski, McDevitt
held that an automobile could not be arbitrarily stopped; rather, a
basis must exist for the suspicion that the motorist violated the
law. 13
4
Furthermore, in Lepinski it was held that the State of New Mex-
ico could detail its own standards for such conduct, but only if
constitutional requirements were satisfied. 35 In light of Brignoni-
Ponce, therefore, the Jenkins decision would appear to be in error.
Although Brignoni-Ponce noted that local enforcement agencies did
have power to enforce laws regulating vehicle and traffic provi-
sions, 36 this was not a blanket prescription to violate constitutional
rights. The Court granted to local enforcement agencies the author-
ity "to conduct such limited stops as are necessary"' 37 to enforce
their laws. Since the Court was concerned with random stops of
vehicles, and required that they not be arbitrary, Brignoni-Ponce is
clearly applicable. 3 '
VT. Further Considerations
Apart from the effect of Brignoni-Ponce, some of those same state
129. 460 F.2d 234, 236-37 (10th Cir. 1972).
130. No. 74-1567, at 5-6.
131. 508 F.2d 8 (10th Cir. 1974).
132. Id. at 10.
133. No. 74-1567, at 5-6.
134. 508 F.2d at 10-11; accord, State v. Holmberg, 194 Neb. 337, -, 231 N.w.2d 672,
681 (1975) (McCown, J., dissenting); see note 122 supra.
135. 460 F.2d at 237; accord, Ker v. California, 374 U.S. 23, 37 (1963); cf. Almeida-
Sanchez v. United States, 413 U.S. 266, 272 (1973).
136. 422 U.S. 873, 883 n.8.
137. Id.; see note 104 supra.
138. See text accompanying notes 104-10 supra.
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courts that have mandated proscriptions against arbitrary stops
seem unwilling to apply them universally.
In Glass v. Commonwealth,3 ' defendant was involved in an auto-
mobile accident and was placed under arrest for driving under the
influence of-alcohol. He subsequently refused to submit to a breath-
alyzer test and his motor vehicle operating privileges were sus-
pended. 4 ' Defendant argued that since he had not been legally ar-
rested at that time, 4' the statute was not applicable to him.' Al-
though the Commonwealth admitted that no lawful arrest had oc-
curred," 3 the Pennsylvania Supreme Court nonetheless affirmed
the suspension stating that there was no statutory indication that
the licensing suspension powers of the Secretary of Transportation
were dependent upon the legality of the arrest.'
In his dissent, Justice Eagan pointed out that such a procedure
was exactly what Swanger was trying to avoid.' 5 The majority's
holding, in light of the admittedly unlawful arrest, "effectively
grant[s] the police unfettered discretion to stop any vehicle.""'
Although factual differences may be seen between Glass and
Swanger, the fact remains that the results reached in them are
inconsistent.
In People v. Martinez,'47 defendant was a passenger in an
automobile stopped' with its motor running in front of a liquor
store. Police officers requested the license and registration'49 from
the driver;' and following a "quick" move to the glove compart-
139. 333 A.2d 768 (Pa. 1975).
140. Id. at 769.
141. This contention was made inasmuch as the officer had not obtained an arrest war-
rant, nor had he seen the offense committed in his presence. Id. at 769-70. See PA. STAT. ANN.
tit. 75 § 1204 (1971), as amended, (Supp. 1975).
142. See PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 75 § 624.1(a) (1971) which predicates this license suspension
power upon the motorist being "placed under arrest."
143. 333 A.2d at 769.
144. Id. at 770.
145. Id. at 772 (Eagen, J., dissenting).
146. Id.
147. 37 N.Y.2d 662, 339 N.E.2d 162, 376 N.Y.S.2d 469 (1975).
148. Although this case did not involve a "stop" in the meaning generally used in this
comment, the court nevertheless treated the case as sufficiently analogous to Ingle. Id. at 668,
339 N.E.2d at 166, 376 N.Y.S.2d at 474.
149. See N.Y. VEH. & TRAF. LAW §§ 401(4), 501(1)(e) (McKinney 1970).
150. The officer stated that this was done "because he suspected 'there was something
going on in reference to the liquor store,' " especially since this occured in a "high crime"
area. 37 N.Y.2d at 664, 339 N.E.2d at 163, 376 N.Y.S.2d at 471.
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ment, opened the door, saw a gun, and arrested the occupants.
Based on information provided by defendant'5 ' and further police
investigation, Martinez was convicted of felony-murder.'52
The New York Court of Appeals affirmed,'53 finding that the stop
was invalid, 54 but that it did not so taint the other evidence as to
require reversal.'55 The court found that the officers had acted in
"good faith" in arresting the occupants after seeing the gun. 5 ' Hav-
ing determined this, "the propriety of the stop [became] irrelevant
for purposes of the admissibility of defendant's custodial state-
ments."' 57
In a concurring opinion,'58 Judge Wachtler'59 criticized the "good
faith" approach of the majority' ° which, taken to its logical conclu-
sion, would encourage disregard of constitutional safeguards on the
part of officers who may then claim "good faith" as a justification
for their conduct.'6 ' Instead, he sustained the conviction on the basis
"that the evidence objected to was not . . . the 'fruit' of the arrest
151. The court discussed the other constitutional issues involved, such as the necessity
of Miranda warnings, the "fruits of the poisonous tree," tainting, and the exclusionary rule.
Since it found that these regulations had been complied with, and affirmed defendant's
conviction, such doctrines will only be discussed here to the extent necessary for this Com-
ment. Id. at 666-71, 339 N.E.2d at 164-67, 376 N.Y.S.2d at 472-76.
152. Id. at 664-66, 339 N.E.2d at 162-64, 376 N.Y.S.2d at 470-72.
153. Id. at 671, 339 N.E.2d at 167, 376 N.Y.S.2d at 476.
154. Id. at 666 n.2, 668, 339 N.E.2d at 164 n.2, 166, 376 N.Y.S.2d at 472 n.2, 474.
155. Id. at 669, 339 N.E.2d at 166, 376 N.Y.S.2d at 475.
156. We hold today that in addition to the dictates of Miranda and the standard
of voluntariness, the controlling consideration for determining the admissability of
'verbal' evidence obtained pursuant to claimed illegal police conduct is whether law
enforcement officers acted in good faith and with a fair basis for belief that probable
cause existed for an arrest.
Id. at 668, 339 N.E.2d at 165, 376 N.Y.S.2d at 473-74.
157. Id. at 669, 339 N.E.2d at 166, 376 N.Y.S.2d at 475.
158. The majority opinion was concurred in by three of the seven member New York Court
of Appeals. Two other concurring opinions were filed, expressing the opinions of the remaining
three justices, wherein the majority's reliance upon the good faith of the police officers was
criticized. Id. at 671-74, 339 N.E.2d at 167-69, 376 N.Y.S.2d at 477-79 (Wachtler, J., concur-
ring); id. at 674, 339 N.E.2d at 170, 376 N.Y.S.2d at 479-80 (Fuchsberg, J., concurring).
159. Judge Wachtler wrote the opinion of the court in People v. Ingle, 36 N.Y.2d 413, 330
N.E.2d 39, 369 N.Y.S.2d 67 (1975); see text accompanying notes 78-87 supra.
160. The Supreme Court has stated that fourth amendment rights do not depend on the
mere "good faith" of the police. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 21-22 (1968); accord, United States
v. Peltier, 422 U.S. 531, 554 (1975) (Brennan, J., dissenting); Jones v. United States, 362 U.S.
257, 273 (1960) (Douglas, J., concurring and dissenting).
161. 37 N.Y.2d at 672, 339 N.E.2d at 168, 376 N.Y.S.2d at 478 (Wachtler, J., concurring).
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. . "162 Though the majority also reached the correct result,'63 its
reliance on "good faith" appears to be inconsistent with the thrust
of Ingle, if not a negation of the effectiveness of Ingle's requirement
of non-arbitrariness. 164
In sum, the Pennsylvania and New York courts do not appear
willing to apply universally their standards of reasonableness to
police actions. Where situations are somewhat different from those
existing in their respective seminal cases, such criteria may be cir-
cumvented. However, the policy attempted to be furthered by those
decisions would be seriously curtailed, if not totally destroyed, by
such a technical application of their holdings.
VII. Conclusion
Without consideration of any additional elements, the decision
that the right to remain free from unreasonable seizures clearly
outweighs the interest of the government in advancing public safety
indicates a definite shift in the fundamental balancing process uti-
lized by the courts. The adoption of "suspicious circumstances,"'6 5
"probable cause based on specific facts,"' 66 "non-arbitrariness,"' 67
"specific and articulable facts,"' 68 or any other test, however, will
162. Id., 339 N.E.2d at 168, 376 N.Y.S.2d at 477 (Wachtier, J., concurring).
163. Note that in his concurring opinion, Judge Wachtler is able to reach the same result
without the practical invalidation of the policies attempted to be furthered by Ingle. Since
the detectives had no idea of the defendant's possible involvement with the homicide at the
time they questioned him, and he had been advised of his Miranda rights, then any existing
taint was attenuated. Therefore, the statement could properly be admitted into evidence as
being consistent with the philosophy of the exclusionary rule %'ithout consideration of the
"good faith" of the police officers. Id. at 673-74, 339 N.E.2d at 169, 376 N.Y.S.2d at 479. For
a brief discussion of the exclusionary rule, see note 177 infra.
164. Ingle was designed to prevent arbitrary stops; here, however, by equating "good
faith" with the police officer's knowledge of constitutional law, the court is effectively pre-
scribing arbitrariness. Judge Wachtler's premonition that the decision of the majority would
"encourage a studied ignorance of constitutional guarantees" is well founded. Under this test,
the officer who has some knowledge of basic constitutional principles will be more restricted,
as his actions could not then be classified as being in "good faith." His counterpart, however,
who knows little of the constitution, would be less limited in his scope of activity, as he would
be acting in "good faith" under the Martinez test. Hence, with practical protection of consti-
tutional rights being predicated on such a subjective basis, citizens would surely be subjected
to arbitrary intrusions. See cases cited in note 160 supra.
165. United States v. Nicholas, 448 F.2d 622 (8th Cir. 1971).
166. Commonwealth v. Swanger, 300 A.2d 66 (Pa.), aff'd on rehearing, 453 Pa. 107, 307
A.2d 875 (1973).
167. People v. Ingle, 36 N.Y.2d 413, 330 N.E.2d 39, 369 N.Y.S.2d 67 (1975).
168. United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. 873 (1975).
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not engender the advantages' 9 sought by these respective courts
unless some procedural restrictions are developed to guarantee their
employment. '
The import of the decisions discussed herein has generally been
to require reasonableness in the actions of the law enforcement offi-
cers. However, no practical definition of "reasonableness" has been
offered, and without one, it is realistic to assume that similar
abridgements of constitutional rights may reoccur in the future.'
It is evident that lesser justifications are necessary for an automo-
bile stop than those to validate a search,'72 but it is not clear what
they are. An allegedly faulty, but in fact functionally operable tail-
light was held sufficient to justify a stop in one jurisdiction,' but
the same circumstances may well be inadequate in another. What-
ever advances may have been made, they are of questionable practi-
cal worth.
Uncertainty followed the holding of the Supreme Court in Brign-
oni-Ponce. Some courts subsequently attempted to limit the case
to its factual situation,' 4 and refused to extend its policy to other
automobile stop cases. This result may be attributed to the
ostensibly limiting language of the Court, ' as well as the other
opinions filed,' 6 which created ambiguity as to the scope of the
decision. However, insofar as the New York and Pennsylvania cases
are concerned, the divergence stems from an apparent refusal to
169. This refers to the guaranteed protection of the fourth amendment rights of the
individual involved, without at the same time obviating the effective performance of the
police.
170. The only practical way would be to establish such standards as are now used in other
similar situations, such as warrantless stops and frisks, wherein the "specific and articulable
facts" of Terry are applicable. See Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968).
171. As one commentator has suggested:
Courts should carefully scrutinize for both probative value and veracity the evidence
presented to justify stops, and should find a founded suspicion only if there are 'criti-
cal' facts which affirmatively suggest the presence of particular criminal activity.
Otherwise, an officer's suspicion to stop may become 'founded' after the stop rather
than before, thus making the stop a violation of the detainee's constitutional rights as
guaranteed by the fourth amendment.
Weisgall, supra note 16, at 258 (footnote omitted) (emphasis added).
172. See, e.g., United States v. Ortiz, 422 U.S. 891, 895-96 (1975); accord, Henry v. United
States, 361 U.S. 98 (1959); Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132 (1925).
173. United States v. Bell, 383 F. Supp. 1298 (D. Neb. 1974); see note 125 supra.
174. See note 104 supra.
175. Id.
176. Id.
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apply universally their own self-engendered proscriptions in this
area.
Although specifying a requirement of probable cause in these situ-
ations may be unduly harsh, the "specific and articulable facts" of
Terry and Brignoni-Ponce appear custom made. However, in order
to implement these criteria, the courts would be required to deline-
ate a test in much the same manner as the Court did in Terry.
Without the statement of some relatively specific standards to be
followed, this desired requirement of reasonableness to police ac-
tions may be vacuous.'77 Therefore, although these decisions have
considerably increased the weight of the individual interest in pri-
vacy to preclude these arbitrary intrusions, and although the Su-
preme Court has recognized that fourth amendment rights may not
simply be based on the "good faith" of the officer involved,' these
existing standards may easily be circumvented in practice. 7 ,
Thus, despite the theoretical trend towards increasing individual
rights which appears in these confusing if not contradictory deci-
sions, constitutional rights may in fact be predicated not only on
geographic location, but also on the temporal mood of the respective
court. '1
Gary D. Stumpp
177. Note the piecemeal extension of the exclusionary rule to the states. In Weeks v.
United States, 232 U.S. 383 (1914) the Court held that the fourth amendment proscription
against unreasonable searches and seizures was made applicable to the federal courts through
the exclusion of any evidence obtained in such a manner. Subsequently, in Wolf v. Colorado,
338 U.S. 25 (1949) the Court held this fourth amendment protection was incorporated through
the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment and was hence binding on the states.
At the same time, however, the exclusionary rule was not made so effective. So the situation
existing then was that local police were not permitted to secure evidence through violations
of the fourth amendment, but if they did .so it was still admissible against the defendant.
Although this situation was later remedied in Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961) which
enforced the exclusionary rule against the states, the practically vacuous protection offered
by the Wolf doctrine in state prosecutions is evident.
178. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 21-22 (1968).
179. For an example of how easily such safeguards may be thwarted, see Ortiz v. United
States, 317 F.2d 277, 278 (5th Cir. 1963).
180. See, e.g., United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. 873 (1975). "Each case must
turn on the totality of the particular circumstances." Id. at 885 n.10.
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